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I.  Introduction 
 
Behavioral theorists augment neoclassical models in order to reconcile economic 
theory with observed phenomena.  For example, Strotz (1956) models the time-
inconsistency phenomenon.  Herbert Simon pioneers the idea—summarized in Simon 
(1979)—that the goal formation of individuals will differ depending upon their relative 
levels of experience and knowledge, among other factors.  More recently, Laibson (1997) 
finds that rational individuals with hyperbolic discounting of the future will opt for 
illiquid assets today in order to make it costly for their future selves to deviate from the 
saving pattern that appears optimal today.  In a related paper, Angeletos, Laibson, 
Repetto, Tobacman, and Weinberg (2001) offer empirical evidence that an awareness of 
hyperbolic discounting may influence individuals’ saving decisions in ways predicted by 
Laibson.  Akerlof (2002) summarizes this literature. 
Our paper empirically considers two related hypotheses.  First, we test the null 
hypothesis that individuals behave in a manner more consistent with the rational 
expectations hypothesis than with the idea of self-control in the face of hyperbolic 
discounting.  Second, we examine whether individuals’ choices differ depending upon 
their relative levels of experience and knowledge.  Finally, using a variety of individual-
specific control variables, we test for robustness of the results. 
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II.  Literature Review 
 
 Under rational expectations, an individual would never overlook the time value of 
money in deciding when to receive income; in the absence of some other cost, sooner 
should always preferred to later.  Nevertheless, university faculty with nine-month 
contracts often volunteer to spread their pay over the entire calendar year.  In fact, Strotz 
(1956) himself states, “I select the option of having my . . . salary dispersed to me on a 
twelve- rather than on a nine-month basis, although I could use the interest!” (p. 173). 
Using data from their own academic institutions, Archibald (1994) and Graham 
and Isaac (2002) have explored this phenomenon.  Archibald believes that there are two 
possible explanations.  First, Archibald posits that the costs—explicit and implicit—in 
taking one’s salary up front may be larger than they appear at first glance.  For example, 
if a professor opts to take her salary over nine months rather than twelve, then she will 
need to engage in additional budgeting activities during the year.  Also, frontloading 
one’s pay may require more frequent bank trips or balance transfers in order to execute 
the budgeting plan.  If these costs are not small, it may be perfectly rational for a 
professor to spread her salary over the calendar year. 
Archibald’s second possible explanation is that, even though faculty appreciate 
the need to take pay over the first nine months, they also know that they—like Strotz—
lack the willpower required to do so successfully.  Using natural experiment evidence 
from the College of William and Mary, Archibald finds stronger support for the self-
imposed constraint theory than for the notion that budgetary and transaction costs devour 
any possible interest earnings derived from frontloaded pay. 
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In addition, Graham and Isaac (2002) admit the possibility of bounded rationality.  
That is, they follow Thaler (1994) and speculate that the optimization problem faced by 
college faculty may simply be too hard for even highly educated individuals to solve.  As 
Hirshleifer (2001) points out, such circumstances occasion the need for some form of 
heuristic simplification.   
Using evidence from a survey of 109 of their peers at American University, 
Graham and Isaac (2002) find that faculty behave in a manner much more consistent with 
behavioral economics than with the simple prediction of rational expectations.  Graham 
and Isaac are careful to point out that insuring oneself today against how one may behave 
tomorrow does not constitute irrational behavior.  In their words, “[t]he dispute concerns 
the constitution of rationality, not the fact of rationality” (p. 399).  
 
III.  Data and Hypothesis Testing 
 
 
 A.  Data 
Our hypothesis testing and analysis employs two unique data sets.  The first 
consists of data received in response to requests mailed directly to public university 
payroll staff and Freedom of Information officers.  We requested information regarding 
payment schedule choices for each university as a whole, as well as—in particular—its 
accounting, finance, and economics departments.  The requests were sent to twelve 
public universities in the upper Midwest where economics, finance, and accounting 
faculty could be uniquely identified.  Geographic proximity to our institution was a key 
factor in determining which schools received the requests.  The total number of faculty 
included in the data set is 6,442.  
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 Table 1 lists the schools that responded.  Figure 1 groups economics, accounting, 
and finance faculty together and compares them to all other faculty members.  The figure 
shows that economists, at 54.61%, most frequently choose the nine-month payment 
option relative to the twelve-month.  Finance faculty members were not far behind, with 
51.46% choosing the nine-month option.  In contrast, only 38.81% of accountants chose 
the nine-month payment option—considerably less than economics and finance faculty.  
About 38.69% of all other faculty members chose the nine-month option as opposed to 
61.31% that chose the twelve-month option.  The data are presented in Table 2. 
 
 B.  Hypothesis Testing 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 
We test the following hypotheses in this section.  First, we test the null hypothesis 
that university faculty uniformly make their academic pay distribution choice in accord 
with the prediction of rational expectations.  That is, we test the null hypothesis that ΠALL 
= 1, where Π represents the proportion receiving their pay over nine months.  Since the 
fraction of all faculty in the data set that select the nine-month option is only .3916, we 
easily reject the null hypothesis in favor of a behavioral alternative. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
Second, we test whether individuals who presumably possess more knowledge or 
expertise know better what to do with their assets.  We conduct this test across two 
dimensions.  First, we consider whether there is heterogeneity among faculty related to 
their specific fields of academic expertise.  In this case, we consider the null hypothesis 
that ΠPVFIELDS = ΠOTHER ; that is, we test the null that the fraction of faculty paid over nine 
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months in the fields that pay most attention the concept of present value—economics, 
accounting, and finance—is not different from the fraction of other faculty who do so.  
Calculation of the appropriate test statistic, distributed as a z, yields a value of 3.15.  
Hence, the null is easily rejected, giving evidence that individuals with more expertise 
may indeed know better what to do with their assets. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 
Next, we conduct a related test for differences among the three disciplines.  Our 
null hypothesis here is the joint null that ΠECON = ΠFINANCE = ΠACCTING.  Rejection of the 
null would imply significant discipline-specific differences among the three groups, 
perhaps suggesting the faculty in economics and finance understand better the time value 
of money than do their accounting counterparts.  The appropriate test statistic of the joint 
null, distributed as a χ2 with two degrees of freedom, is 7.70, which permits rejection of 
the joint null hypothesis at the α = 0.05 level of significance.  The fraction of accounting 
faculty that receive their pay over 9 months (.3881) is small enough compared to their 
finance (.5146) and economics (.5461) counterparts that we conclude that the differences 
among these fractions are not due to chance alone.   
 
Hypothesis 4 
 
Finally, we conduct an “IQ” test among institutions.  That is, we consider whether 
faculty differ in their pay distribution choice across institutions of varying academic 
reputation.  If, on average, more intelligent individuals are drawn to more prestigious 
academic institutions, then one could reasonably expect that a greater fraction of faculty 
at top institutions opt to receive their pay sooner rather than later.   
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Using the stratification system and rankings given in U. S. News & World Report 
- America's Best Colleges, we grouped the nine responding institutions into two 
categories:  doctoral and master’s.  Among our responding institutions, six qualify as 
doctoral universities.  Among these institutions, the fraction of faculty that receives pay 
in the first nine months is .4135.  The remaining three institutions are classified as 
master’s universities.  Here, the fraction of faculty that opts to receive pay in the first nine 
months is .3305.  Our null becomes ΠDOCTORAL = ΠMASTER’S.  Calculation of the 
appropriate statistic, again distributed as a z, yields a value of 5.94.  Hence we easily 
reject the null hypothesis of no difference between faculty at the two institution types. 
 
C.  Preliminary Conclusions 
 
In this section of the paper we have conducted several empirical hypothesis tests 
surrounding two central ideas of behavioral economics.  First, we examined whether 
faculty with nine-month academic contracts receive their pay over nine months, finding 
that they significantly opt to receive their pay over twelve rather than nine months.   
Second, we probed whether there are significant differences among faculty 
depending upon proxies for their specific knowledge, expertise, and intelligence.  Here 
our proxies were academic discipline and institutional type.  In both cases we found 
significant differences. 
Of course, our analysis is limited inasmuch as we offer little in the way of any 
control variables.  Since we obtained our data via the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), universities could not tell us more about specific individuals than what the 
institutions are obligated to supply as public information.  In order to control for other 
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variables, and to test the robustness of our results, we gathered an additional set of data 
using a web-based survey.  We describe those data and our tests for robustness below. 
 
IV.  Data and Tests for Robustness 
 
While we have thus far been able to reject all null hypotheses in favor of 
behavioral alternatives, we have not controlled for any other factors that may influence a 
faculty member’s pay frequency decision.  Hence, in this section, we test the robustness 
of our results once we have controlled for other possible individual-specific factors that 
could influence a professor’s choice.   
We subsequently conducted a web-based survey of faculty in public universities 
in Michigan in order to obtain information regarding individual-specific factors related to 
our research question.  Using e-mail, we contacted a randomly-chosen sample of faculty 
from nine universities.  We selected these institutions because they are large enough that 
we were able to identify uniquely professors of accounting, economics, and finance.   
We had previously telephoned human resource departments at these and other 
public universities in Michigan to determine whether their faculty indeed have the option 
to receive their pay over nine or twelve months.  Three of the institutions we contacted—
Michigan State University, the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, and Wayne State 
University—stated that they did not offer the option.   
The email message contained a link to the survey web page, depicted in Figure 2. 
The survey was sent to a total of 662 faculty members.  There were 180 survey responses, 
giving a survey response rate of approximately 27 percent.  Refer to Table 3 for a 
summary of the responses.  Of those 180 responses, only 155 could be used for the data 
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analysis because they either did not fully complete the survey or they had calendar-year 
contracts instead of academic-year contracts (e.g., department chairs). 
The dependent variable, TWELVEMONTHt, indicates whether a faculty member 
chooses the nine- or twelve-month pay option.  If she chooses the twelve-month pay 
option, the dependent variable is one; the variable equals zero otherwise.  We estimate a 
total of three specifications of our logit regression model that takes the general form 
TWELVEMONTH = xβ + e, 
where x is a vector of individual-specific characteristics that may influence an 
individual’s paycheck disbursement choice. 
In all specifications of the model we included variables indicating both faculty 
rank and area of academic expertise.  For faculty rank, we included three dummy 
variables:  ASSTt, ASSOCt, and PROFt.  Each takes a value of one if a faculty member 
holds the rank of assistant, associate, or full professor, respectively.  Individuals who fall 
outside of all these categories may include lecturers and instructors. 
For area of expertise, we again included three dummy variables:  ACCTt, ECONt, 
and FINANCEt.  Each takes a value of one if a faculty member defines her primary area 
of expertise as accounting, economics, or finance, respectively.  Individuals who fall 
outside of all these categories include those teaching in other disciplines. 
In our first specification we also included all variables our survey would permit.  
These were all 0-1 dummies designed to capture factors beyond academic rank 
(presumably also related to age) and area of expertise that might influence an individual’s 
pay frequency choice.  KNOWt is a variable reflecting whether an individual is aware that 
her institution offers a choice concerning when she may receive her pay.  This variable 
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corresponds to question number five on the survey.  A “Yes” response takes a value of 
one, and indicates that an individual is aware of the choice available to her; the variable 
equals zero otherwise. 
PRIMINCt equals one if a faculty member’s academic pay constitutes her primary 
source of income, and equals zero otherwise.  MARRYt equals one if a faculty member is 
married, and equals zero otherwise.  MARHOUSEt equals one if a faculty member is both 
married and the primary household income earner, and zero otherwise.  CHILDt equals 
one if a faculty member has children, and zero otherwise. 
We expected the estimated coefficients of ACCTt, ECONt, and FINANCEt, to all 
bear a negative sign.  We anticipated that the estimated coefficient of the KNOWt variable 
would bear a negative sign—perhaps suggesting that those who are aware of their options 
have probably considered them and, consequently, opted not to spread their pay over 
twelve months.   
For the variables that indicate faculty rank, ASSTt, ASSOCt, PROFt, we were less 
certain what sign(s) to expect for their estimated coefficients.   However, we were 
nevertheless able to speculate about the values of the coefficients relative to each other.  
Assuming that faculty rank is somewhat correlated with age, then—following Simon—
one might expect that age brings wisdom; that is, one might expect that βASST > βASSOC > 
βPROF, indicating that younger faculty are relatively more likely to spread their pay over 
twelve months than are their counterparts.   
We expected signs of the estimated coefficients of PRIMINCt, MARRYt, 
MARHOUSEt, and CHILDt to be positive, since the opportunity costs for these 
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individuals of not budgeting carefully could impact a larger number of individuals than in 
the case of one faculty member living alone with no dependents.  
Our initial logistic regression results are presented in the first column of Table 4.  
The ACCTt, ECONt, and FINANCEt variables all bore the expected sign, although only 
the ACCTt variable appeared to be significant.  KNOWt also yielded the expected sign, 
but appeared to be insignificant.  The estimated equation gave the expected relationship 
among the variables indicating faculty rank.  Among PRIMINCt, MARRYt, MARHOUSEt, 
and CHILDt, all but the coefficient of MARHOUSEt matched our expectations.  The 
CHILDt variable was significant at the α = 0.05 level.   
The high significance of the overall regression, combined with the low levels of 
significance of several our variables, led us to suspect that the model may have been 
overspecified.    After preliminary testing confirmed our suspicion, we respecified the 
model in the following way.  First, we reduced our faculty rank variables to two:  ASSTt 
(defined as before) and SENIORt, a variable that equals one if a faculty member holds 
either the rank of associate or full professor.  SENIORt equals zero otherwise.  Our 
thinking was that senior faculty may be older, have tenure, and—as a result—face a 
different optimization problem than their junior counterparts. 
Second, we also reduced our academic area variables to two.  Since finance is a 
subfield of economics, we pooled ECONt and FINANCEt to create the ECONFINt 
variable.  ECONFINt takes a value of one if a faculty member considers her primary area 
of expertise to be either economics or finance, and equals zero otherwise. 
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Finally, we dropped PRIMINCt, and MARHOUSEt, from the equation since there 
appeared to be a collinear relationship among PRIMINCt, MARRYt, and MARHOUSEt.  
Our results appear in the second column of Table 4.  
Our respecified model and results confirm our suspicion that the original model 
had been overspecified.  Both of the faculty-rank variables appear significant at the α = 
0.05 level or better.  The revised equation also maintains the expected relationship among 
the faculty-rank variables.  The academic subject area variables continue to bear the 
expected sign.  The sign on the marriage variable has changed, but the significance of 
that variable in the regression equation appears quite low.  The CHILDt variable was 
again significant at the α = 0.05 level.   
 Lastly, we augment the regression equation to include MASTER’St, a dummy 
variable that equals one if a respondent is employed at a university classified as a 
master’s university by U. S. News & World Report.  Estimated coefficients from the 
augmented equation appear in the last column of Table 4. 
In this final version, the regression exhibits the greatest level of significance.  
Both of the faculty rank variables are again significant at the α = 0.05 level or better.  The 
expected relationship among the rank variables is preserved, although their estimated 
coefficients are not significantly different from each other.  Both of the academic subject 
variables bear the expected sign and appear significant at either the α = 0.1 or α = 0.05 
levels.  The CHILDt variable is again significant at the α = 0.05 level in the expected 
direction.  While insignificant, the estimated coefficients of both MASTER’St and 
MARRYt nevertheless bear the expected sign. 
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V.  Conclusions 
 
Our paper considers empirically two key hypotheses of the literature of behavioral 
economics.  First, we test the null hypothesis that individuals behave, on average, in a 
manner more consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis than with the idea of 
self-control in the face of hyperbolic discounting in their saving decisions.  Second, we 
examine whether individuals exhibit Herbert Simon’s notion that the goal formation of 
individuals will differ depending upon their relative levels of experience and knowledge. 
Using data from public universities, we examine these hypotheses in light of the 
decisions made by university faculty concerning whether to (1) receive their academic-
year pay in the first nine months or (2) spread their pay over the entire calendar year.  
Our evidence is more consistent with the behavioral literature than with rational 
expectations.  Further, individual-specific factors such as academic field and faculty rank 
are significant predictors.  In particular, professors in economics and finance are 
significantly more likely to receive their pay sooner.  We also find that individuals with 
children are significantly more likely to receive their pay over twelve months. 
Hirshleifer (2001) catalogs a variety of judgment and decision biases, including 
the status quo bias—the tendency for an individual to prefer the default option among 
alternatives.  Hence, the current paper could be extended to control for the manner in 
which pay options are presented to faculty at each institution, or how cumbersome 
making a switch might be.  Unfortunately, measuring accurately and consistently the 
difficulty of making a payroll change across so many different institutions may be 
extremely problematic.  An additional line of research could consider to what extent there 
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might be a wealth or income effect since accounting, finance, and economics faculty are 
among the highest income earners within academia. 
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Table 1.  Responding Institutions 
Indiana State University 
Iowa State University 
Central Michigan University 
Eastern Michigan University 
Ferris (MI) State University 
Grand Valley (MI) State University 
Western Michigan University 
Bowling Green (OH) State University 
Miami University of Ohio 
Figure 1.  Distribution of Disbursement Choices Across Academic Department
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School University Total  Economics Dept  Accounting Dept  Finance Dept  All other Faculty 
  Total 9 mos. 12 mos.   Total 9 mos. 12 mos.   Total 9 mos. 12 mos.   Total 9 mos. 12 mos.   Total 9 mos. 12 mos. 
                    
Grand Valley State University 546 159 387  8 6 2  13 3 10  8 0 8  517 150 367 
                    
Central Michigan University 706 284 422  19 11 8  16 8 8  18 11 7  653 254 399 
                    
Western Michigan University 761 161 600  17 3 14  14 5 9  17 9 8  713 144 569 
                    
Iowa State University 1178 744 434  37 23 14  16 3 13  9 2 7  1116 716 400 
                    
Eastern Michigan University 667 246 421  11 7 4  15 8 7  20 15 5  621 216 405 
                    
Ferris State University 421 135 286  5 3 2  9 4 5  3 3 0  404 125 279 
                    
Indiana State University 526 148 378  9 5 4  7 1 6  4 1 3  506 141 365 
                    
Bowling Green State U. 820 295 525  13 6 7  20 7 13  7 4 3  780 278 502 
                    
Miami University (Ohio) 817 356 461  22 13 9  24 13 11  17 8 9  754 322 432 
                                        
                    
                    
Totals 6442 2528 3914   141 77 64   134 52 82   103 53 50   6064 2346 3718 
                    
Percentages 100% 39.24% 60.76%  100% 54.61% 45.39%  100% 38.81% 61.19%  100% 51.46% 48.54%  100% 38.69% 61.31% 
 
Table 2.  Data Received from University Human Resource Departments in Fall 2001 
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Figure 2.  Survey Questionnaire 
 
Please take a couple minutes to complete this short survey. All personal 
information will be kept confidential and any connection with your identity 
will be destroyed. Thank you for your cooperation.  
Please enter the six-digit code from the email message. (For record-keeping 
purposes only. All responses are confidential.)  
 
 
 
1. What is your current rank?  
 

Assistant Professor 

Associate Professor 

Professor 

Other Full-Time 

Part-Time 
2. How many years have you been at your current rank?  
 
 
 
3. Which is your academic area of expertise?  
 

Accounting 

Economics 

Finance 

Other 
 
If Other, please indicate your academic area of expertise  
 
 
 
4. Is your teaching contract for the academic year (9 months) or the 
calendar year (12 months)?  
 

Academic Year 

Calendar Year 
5. Does your college/university provide faculty with academic-year 
contracts (9 months), the option to distribute their pay over either 9 or 12 
months?  
 

Yes 

No 
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6. If your teaching contract is for the academic year, do you receive your 
pay over 9 or 12 months?  
 
 9 months 

12 months 
7. Is your academic pay your primary source of personal income?  
 
 Yes 

No 
8. What is your current marital status?  
 

Married 

Single 
9. If you are married, are you the primary income earner in the household?   
 

Yes 

No 
 
10. Do you have any children?  
 

Yes 

No 
 
Submit
 
Reset
 
 
 
1
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Table 3.  Survey Responses 
School University Total Economics Dept. Accounting Dept. Finance Dept. All Other Faculty
Total 9 mos. 12 mos. Total 9 mos. 12 mos. Total 9 mos. 12 mos. Total 9 mos. 12 mos. Total 9 mos. 12 mos.
Central Michigan University 28 14 14 4 3 1 2 2 0 6 5 1 16 4 12
Eastern Michigan University 16 6 10 1 1 0 4 2 2 1 1 0 10 2 8
Ferris State University 10 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 3 7
Grand Valley State University 31 11 19 4 3 1 3 0 3 3 0 3 21* 8 12
Lake Superior State University 8 3 5 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 3
Michigan Technological University 19 7 11 4* 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 1 13 6 7
Northern Michigan University 4 2 2 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Oakland University 8 3 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 5
Saginaw Valley State University 4 0 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2
Western Michigan University 40 9 27 9* 2 6 7* 2 4 4 1 3 20** 4 14
Totals 168 58 104 30 13 15 17 7 9 16 7 9 105 31 71
Percentages 100% 34.52% 61.90% 100% 43.33% 50% 100% 41.18% 52.94% 100% 43.75% 56.25% 100% 29.52% 67.62%
* one respondent did not indicate which payment option they received, but were included in total
** two respondents did not indicate which payment option they received, but were included in total
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Table 4.  Regression Results for the Logit Models 
Dependent variable is TWELVEMONTHt.   
 Estimated Coefficients 
Indep. Var. (1) (2) (3) 
ASSTt 1.449 
(1.772)* 
1.845 
(2.655)*** 
1.944 
(2.774)*** 
ASSOCt 1.239 
(1.502) 
  
PROFt 0.835 
(1.053) 
  
SENIORt  1.280 
(2.049)** 
1.272 
(2.027)** 
ACCTt -1.002 
(-1.694)* 
-0.826 
(-1.524) 
-0.932 
(-1.684)* 
ECONt -0.559 
(-0.992) 
  
FINANCEt -0.518 
(-0.739) 
  
ECONFINt  -0.807 
(-1.904)* 
-0.864 
(-1.994)** 
KNOWt -0.571 
(-0.560) 
  
PRIMINCt 0.329 
(0.439) 
  
MARRYt 1.035 
(1.015) 
-0.232 
(-0.660) 
-0.468 
(-0.842) 
MARHOUSEt -0.128 
(-0.244) 
  
CHILDt 1.197 
(2.293)** 
1.106 
(2.472)** 
1.014 
(2.215)** 
MASTER’St   0.249 
(0.660) 
constant -1.675 
(-1.140) 
-0.889 
(-1.290) 
-0.734 
(-1.026) 
    
 LR χ
2
 (11) = 18.75 LR χ
2
 (6) = 19.06 LR χ
2
 (7) = 19.43 
 Prob > χ2 = 0.0657 Prob > χ2 = 0.0041 Prob > χ2 = 0.0069 
z-statistics given in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the α = 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
 
